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Roundtree: Corporate Law

CORPORATE LAW
I. COURT EXPANDS REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO OPPRESSED MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS UNDER THE CORPORATE DISSOLUTION PROVISIONS

In Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co.' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that an aggrieved shareholder who alleges a legitimate ground
for corporate dissolution may obtain an alternative remedy without
actually demanding dissolution.' The Hite court expanded the relief
available to oppressed minority shareholders by allowing shareholders to
seek directly a court-ordered buy-out or other remedy through the
judicial
dissolution provisions of the South Carolina Business Corporation
Act.3
Hite, the minority shareholder, owned one-third of the outstanding
stock of Thomas & Howard Co. of Florence (Florence Corporation). The
majority shareholder, Thomas & Howard Co. of Columbia (Columbia
Corporation), voted to increase the authorized number of shares of the
Florence Corporation. Over Hite's opposition, the majority shareholder
also approved a stock exchange agreement that provided for the issuance
of one share of the Florence Corporation's common stock in exchange
for approximately ten shares of the Columbia Corporation's common
stock. This exchange reduced Hite's ownership interest in the Florence
Corporation from 33.33% to 11.5% of the outstanding stock.4 Hite
brought suit seeking, among other relief, dissenter's rights or a courtordered buy-out.'

1. 305 S.C. 358, 409 S.E.2d 340 (1991).

2. Ad. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 344. Section 33-14-300(2)(ii) of the South Carolina

Business Corporation Act permits dissolution of a corporation for conduct, by those
in control, "that is illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial either to the
corporation or to any shareholder." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(ii) (Law. Coop. 1990). Section ,3314-310(d) lists remedies, other than dissolution of the

corporation, that a court may order in a shareholder's action for dissolution. Id. § 3314-310(d).
3. See Hite, 305 S.C. at 363-64, 409 S.E.2d at 343-44. South Carolina's
provisions for judicially supervised corporate dissolution are codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-14-300 to -330 (Law. Co-op. 1990). See generally Theresa L. Kruk,
Annotation, Relief Other Than by Dissolution in Cases of IntracorporateDeadlock
or Dissension, 34 A.L.R.4TH 13 (1984).
4. Hite, 305 S.C. at 360-61, 409 S.E.2d at 341-42.
5. Id. at 362-63, 409 S.E.2d 342-43. Hite also sued for breach of fiduciary duty
and negligent mismanagement. Id. at 361-62, 409 S.E.2d at 342. The court
determined that Hite properly brought the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty

and negligent mismanagement as an individual action, not as a derivative action,
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The court dispensed with Hite's claim for dissenter's rights by
strictly construing South Carolina's dissenter's rights statute.6 Section 3313-102 provides that a shareholder may dissent and receive fair market
value for her shares if, among other reasons, her corporation's shares are
acquired in a share exchange.7 However, the court concluded that Hite
was not entitled to dissenter's rights because he owned shares in the
acquiring company, not in the acquiredcompany.' The Hite court also
concluded that dissenter's rights were not necessary because Hite had an
adequate remedy under the judicial dissolution provisions.' Notably,
however, Hite did not allege that the Columbia Corporation improperly
denied him any preemptive rights.' 0
In another cause of action, Hite sought relief under South Carolina's
judicial dissolution provisions." Hite alleged oppressive, fraudulent, and
unfair conduct by the majority shareholder, but sought a court-ordered
buy-out of his shares at fair market value under section 33-14-310(d)(4),
instead of a dissolution. 2 Essentially, Hite sought to use the Corporate
Code's dissolution provisions to obtain substantially the same relief that
3
was unavailable to him under the dissenter's rights provisions.1

because Hite's alleged loss was "separate and distinct from that of the corporation."
Id. at 361, 409 S.E.2d at 345 (citing Ward v. Griffin, 295 S.C. 219, 367 S.E.2d 703
(Ct. App. 1988)).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102 (Law. Co-op. 1990), construed in Hite, 305
S.C. at 362-63, 409 S.E.2d at 342-43.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102(2).
8. Hite, 305 S.C. at 363, 409 S.E.2d at 343. The court specifically refused to
follow Morley Bros. v. Clark, 361 N.W.2d 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting
a substantially similar statute to allow dissenter's rights to the minority shareholders
of an acquiring corporation). Hite, 305 S.C. at 363, 409 S.E.2d at 343.
9. Hite, 305 S.C. at 363, 409 S.E.2d at 343. The remedies under the judicial
dissolution provisions are discussed infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Stephen H. Schulman & Alen Schenk, Shareholders' Voting
and Appraisal Rights in CorporateAcquisition Transactions, 38 Bus. LAW. 1529
(1983) (examining voting and dissenting rights in corporate acquisitions).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-14-300 to -330 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
12. See Hite, 305 S.C. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 343-44. Section 33-14-310(d)
provides:
In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation on the
grounds enumerated in Section 33-14-300, the court may make such order
or grant such relief, other than dissolution, as in its discretion appropriate,
including, without limitation, an order:... (4) providing for the purchase
at their fair value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation
or by other shareholders.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
13. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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The court held that a shareholder who alleges sufficient grounds for
dissolution may seek the alternative relief provided in section 33-14310(d) without demanding dissolution. The court justified its broad
interpretation of section 33-14-310(e) by stating that "[tihe purpose of
allowing alternative equitable relief is to avoid the drastic remedy of
dissolution."15
The problems encountered by the minority shareholder in Hite are
not uncommon because close corporations are prone to intracorporate
hostility and dissension.' 6 Dissatisfied minority shareholders of a close
corporation are in a difficult position because they typically have no
voting power to effect corporate changes. Additionally, minority
shareholders have no ready market in which to sell their shares 7 and
often are limited by share transfer restrictions.'" Moreover, as Hite
demonstrates, dissenter's rights provisions may not adequately protect
minority shareholders from fundamental corporate changes because the
majority often can structure transactions to avoid dissenter's rights
altogether.' 9 The frustration of minority shareholders often culminates in
a dissolution suit.
A court-ordered buy-out is the most frequent remedy in dissolution
suits because this remedy is less drastic than dissolution and provides
advantages for both the majority and minority shareholders.2" After a
buy-out, the disgruntled minority shareholder is free to pursue other
investments, and the majority has eliminated the divisive shareholders. 2'
Prior to Hite, minority shareholders who brought dissolution actions
hoping for an alternative remedy took the risk that a court might dissolve

14. Hite, 305 S.C. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 344.

15. Id. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 343-44. Section 33-14-310(e) provides: "The relief
authorized in subsection (d) may be granted as an alternative to a decree of
dissolution or may be granted whenever the circumstances of the case are such that
the relief, but not dissolution, is appropriate." S.C. CODE- ANN. § 33-14-310(e)
(Law. Co-op. 1990).
16. Common areas of friction include family and marital conflicts, disagreements
between employee-shareholders and nonemployee-shareholders, and basic disagreements over corporate policy. See generallyF. Hodge O'Neal, OppressionofMinority
Shareholders:ProtectingMinority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 121, 122 (1987).

17. Id. at 123.
18. See S.C. CODE, ANN. § 33-6-270 (Law. Co-op. 1990).

19. See O'Neal, supra note 16, at 138.
20. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of InvoluntaryDissolution Suits
as a Remedy for Close CorporationDissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 25, 53 (1987).
21. See O'Neal, supra note 16, at 123 ("Some corporate officers say they have
to spend more time and thought in keeping minority shareholders pacified than in
operating by
theScholar
business.").
Published
Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6

1992]

CORPORATE LAW

the corporation instead of granting alternative relief. The chilling effect
of this risk may have deterred many oppressed shareholders from seeking
dissolution.
Although Hite is a versatile tool, it merely opens the courthouse
doors for oppressed minority shareholders by providing an- increased
array of remedies.' A minority shareholder still must prove actual
oppression before a court will order a judicially supervised buy-out or
other alternative remedy under the dissolution provisions of the South
Carolina Corporate Code.'
Dana R. Rountree

22. Oppression is a vague concept that rarely results from a single incident, but
rather from a series of otherwise legitimate actions that form a pattern of oppression.
See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, What
Amounts to "Oppressive" Conduct Under Statute Authorizing Dissolution of
Corporationat Suit of Minority Stockholders, 56 A.L.R.3D 358 (1974). Ultimately,
the existence of oppression is a question of fact. See Richard C. Tinney, Oppressive
Conduct by Majority Shareholders, Directors, or Those in Control of Corporation,
5 AM. JUR. P.O.F.2D 645 (1975).
23. Dissolution and its corresponding alternative remedies should be reserved
only for situations in which the majority subjects the minority to "genuine abuse[s]
rather than ... acceptable tactics in a power struggle for control of a corporation."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 official cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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